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A problem in computer security is identification of attack signatures in network packets.
An attack signature is a pattern of bits that characterizes a particular attack. Because
there are many kinds of attacks, there are potentially many attack signatures.
Furthermore, attackers may seek to avoid detection by altering the attack mechanism so
that the bit pattern presented differs from the known signature. Thus, recognizing attack
signatures is a problem in approximate string matching. The time to perform an
approximate string match depends upon the length of the string and the number of
patterns. For constant string length, the time to match n patterns is approximately O(n);
the time increases approximately linearly as the number of patterns increases.
A binary cellular automaton is a discrete, deterministic system of cells in which each cell
can have one of two values. Cellular automata have the property that the next state of
each cell can be evaluated independently of the others. If there is a processing element
for each cell, the next states of all cells in a cellular automaton can be computed
simultaneously.
Because there is no programming paradigm for cellular automata, cellular automata to
perform specific functions are created ad hoc by hand or discovered using search
methods such as genetic algorithms.
This research has identified, through evolution by genetic algorithm, cellular automata
that can perform approximate string matching for more than one pattern while operating
in constant time with respect to the number of patterns, and in the presence of noise.
Patterns were recognized by using the bits of a network packet payload as the initial state
of a cellular automaton. After a predetermined number of cycles, the ones density of the
cellular automaton was computed. Packets for which the ones density was below an
experimentally determined threshold were identified as target packets. Six different
cellular automaton rules were tested against a corpus of 7.2 million TCP packets in the
IDEval data set. No rule produced false negative results, and false positive results were
acceptably low.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Background
A problem in computer security is the detection of malicious data in transit
through networks or on entry to a host computer. One approach to this problem is
signature-based detection, in which data are compared against known patterns (Stallings
& Brown, 2008). This is very similar to pattern detection in large data sets. In both
cases, efficient algorithms for comparing data to multiple known patterns are required.
Cellular automata have been used for language recognition (Sommerhalder &
Westrhenen, 1983), pattern recognition (Ganguly et al., 2004), and as associative
memories (Chowdhury et al., 2002). This research demonstrates that a cellular
automaton can be an effective tool for both signature-based detection of malicious data
and for pattern searching in large data sets. A cellular automaton is a Moore model1
finite state machine in which the next state of a node (cell) depends only upon the current
state of the node and the current states of neighboring nodes (Sarkar, 2000). Thus, the
next state of each cell can be computed independently of the next states of any others;
with sufficiently many computing elements, the next state of every cell can be computed
in parallel with all the others (Sommerhalder & Westrhenen, 1983). Because of the

1

In a Moore model finite state machine, the outputs are driven by the state register, and so can
change only when the state changes. This is in contrast to the Mealy model finite state machine, in which
the outputs are driven by combinational logic and can change as a result of changing inputs, independent of
a state change (Mano & Kime, 2007).
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inherent parallelism in cellular automata, this approach is potentially faster than other
methods of pattern recognition provided that the implementation is able to take advantage
of the parallelism.
While cellular automata have the advantages just described, there is a major
disadvantage: there is no programming paradigm that will produce a cellular automaton
for a specified task (Crutchfield et al., 1998). Instead, cellular automata for specific
applications must be discovered. Because the search space gets very large for even
simple cellular automata (Mitchell et al., 1996) a heuristic search rather than an
exhaustive search is needed. One mechanism for such a heuristic search is the genetic
algorithm (Reeves & Rowe, 2003).
This report describes cellular automata that can recognize specific patterns
relevant to computer security in constant time and in the presence of noise. Such cellular
automata are potentially applicable to searching of large databases. Heuristic search with
a genetic algorithm was used to discover the cellular automata described here.
Problem Statement
There is currently no way of identifying single packet network attack signatures in
less than approximately linear time. A network attack is the transmission of data to a
system with the intent of violating the system’s security policy (Bishop, 2003). A single
packet attack signature is a characteristic pattern that can be identified without reference
to the other packets that may accompany it. The time required by current methods to
check for characteristic patterns increases approximately linearly as the number of
signatures to be tested increases. However, if two or more patterns could be checked
simultaneously, the process of testing for those patterns would operate in constant time,
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O(1). Cellular automata have the property that a given number of cycles requires
constant time (Sommerhalder & Westrhenen, 1983). This report identifies a specific pair
of patterns that can be detected in constant time through the application of a cellular
automaton. However, it may not be the case that any arbitrary set of patterns can be
detected in constant time.
For known attacks against computer or network resources, malicious packets can
often be detected using signature analysis, matching incoming packets against patterns
known to represent attacks (Bishop, 2003). However, signature matching to detect
malicious packets is complicated by the fact that the contents of the packets may change
over time. Sometimes the changes are result of modifications by the attacker. Often,
malicious software is designed to be self-modifying, substituting equivalent instructions,
so the function of the malicious packet remains the same but the actual bits transmitted
change in an attempt to defeat signature-matching defenses (Vinod et al., 2009). These
perturbations appear as noise with respect to the signature (pattern) and the data being
checked (Erdogan & Cao, 2007).
Thus, the problem of detecting known malicious network packets through
signature analysis is a problem of approximate string matching. Navarro (2001) provides
an extensive survey of approximate string matching and shows that the best algorithms
operate in near linear time, O(n), where n is the size of the string to be searched.
Checking each signature pattern requires time O(n). As the number of signatures to be
checked increases, the time to examine each packet increases. So, for m signatures, the
time to check a packet is O(nm), linear time if n is constant. When the number of patterns
becomes large, the time to check each packet against every pattern also becomes large.
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This report describes the use of cellular automata for malicious packet detection,
including the degree of parallelism possible and the sensitivity and specificity of
detection.
Dissertation Goal
This report describes a proof of concept mechanism for comparing payload
portion of network packets to two patterns known to represent attacks through the use of
a cellular automaton. The mechanism detects such patterns even in the presence of small
changes in the actual packet and has constant detection time with respect to the number
of patterns checked. Specifically, adding a second pattern does not increase detection
time.
Implementation was on a standard personal computer without parallel
computation capability. However, the mechanism itself is capable of highly-parallel
operation if implemented in a parallel computing environment. Testing used the
MIT/DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluation data set, a publicly available data
set, as described in (Haines et al., 2001) and others.
Research Questions
Three principal questions were addressed by this research. First, whether it is
possible to identify cellular automata that can recognize the patterns of more than one
known network attack. Second, whether recognizing such patterns is possible in the
presence of noise or perturbation. Third, whether genetic algorithms are an appropriate
vehicle for identifying such cellular automata. Each of these questions has been
addressed separately by others. They are considered together here, and in the context of
intrusion detection and the recognition of patterns in the presence of noise.

5
Cellular automata have been applied to the task of pattern recognition since
Smith’s work in 1971 (Smith, 1971) and to language recognizers, including the work of
Sommerhalder and Westrhenen (1983). The work of Wolfram (2002) has shown that
there exist cellular automata that are sensitive to initial conditions. Mitchell et al. (1994)
and Crutchfield et al. (1998) have successfully evolved cellular automata using genetic
algorithms and have shown that there exist cellular automata that reach known
configurations under certain conditions of initial input but not others. Wolfram (1994), in
describing three classes of cellular automata, observed that Class 2 cellular automata
function as filters. Wolfram (1994) suggested their application to enhancing specific
patterns in digital image processing. Ganguly et al. (2004) have used cellular automata in
pattern recognition.
A major advantage of using a cellular automaton for pattern recognition is the
ability to detect patterns in the presence of noise or perturbation (Maji et al., 2003).
Another advantage is the ability to operate in constant time (Ganguly et al., 2004;
Sommerhalder & Westrhenen, 1983) . A third advantage is that the nature of the cellular
automaton can be changed by changing the rule that is evaluated; changes to the
underlying implementation of the cellular automaton are not needed (Wolfram, 1994).
It follows from the characteristics of cellular automata as described by Wolfram
(1994) that, if there is a processing unit for each cell, the next state for every cell can be
computed in parallel. Thus, in the case of fully parallel computation, the time to detect a
pattern depends only on the number of cycles required to reach a recognizable state, and
not on the number of cells in the cellular automaton. For the patterns studied, the time to
recognize a pattern is also independent of the number of patterns recognized (Ganguly et
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al., 2004). Such a cellular automaton operates in constant time, O(1) because the number
of cycles necessary to identify a pattern is independent of the size of the string being
checked and of the number of patterns being compared. If fully associative comparison
is used to detect the state of the cellular automaton that signals recognition, then the
entire mechanism operates in constant time. However, operation in constant time is
possible only for the special case that there exists a cellular automaton that can detect a
specific set of patterns.
This report describes the use of a genetic algorithm to evolve a cellular automaton
that can detect two specific patterns, each of which characterizes an attack against a
network, even in the presence of noise or purposeful perturbation, and which operates in
constant time with respect to the number of patterns.
Relevance and Significance
The results reported here directly address the problem of identifying malicious
network packets by their signatures in the presence of perturbations and in constant time
for a given packet size regardless of whether one or two patterns were checked. The
resulting mechanism could be applied to network packets at the point that they enter a
protected computing system, namely at the network interface. It could also provide an
efficient, highly parallel mechanism for searching large data sets for known patterns. In
either case, the inherent parallelism of cellular automata allows all bits of the packet to be
examined simultaneously provided sufficient parallelism is available in the hardware
running the cellular automaton. Fully parallel implementation would require specialized
hardware, such as multiple graphics processor cards or an application-specific integrated
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circuit (ASIC). A detector for a 1,500 byte Ethernet packet requires 12,000 processing
elements.
This report describes a mechanism capable of identifying malicious network
packets at hardware speeds provided suitable parallel computation resources are
provided. Although it is in no respect a complete solution to the problem of protecting
networks and computing systems, it fits well with other current research in the area.
Specifically, it represents a contribution to distributed intrusion detection as described by
Rhodes et al. (2000) and Forrest et al. (1997), among others. Further, it contributes to the
area of NIC-based intrusion detection as described by Singaraju et al. (2005), Clark et al.
(2004) and Otey et al. (2003).
The result described is a proof of concept implementation in software of the
cellular automaton. Such a cellular automaton is capable of improved protection of
computer systems from identifiable attack signatures, even in the presence of noise. An
important result of this research is a detection algorithm that can be implemented in a
highly parallel fashion.
Barriers and Issues
The test data set used was the MIT/DARPA Intrusion Detection System
Evaluation (IDEval) test data set. There has been considerable criticism of the qualities
of this data set. Most of the criticism is of anomalies introduced through production of
synthetic data. The experimental team at MIT synthesized the test data rather than using
data captured from an operating network for considerations of privacy and the probability
that sensitive data would be captured and subsequently exposed to the intrusion detection
systems under evaluation (Mahoney & Chan, 2003).
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Mahoney and Chan (2003) identified eight simulation artifacts in the TCP or IP
headers and only three in the payload portion. Because the pattern recognition described
here focuses on the payload data, the header artifacts do not constitute a barrier to the use
of the data set.
The three payload-related simulation artifacts were all related to higher-level
protocol information carried as payload in the TCP/IP packets, and not the actual data
part of the payload. They included highly regular HTTP request headers, similar
regularity in SMTP requests, and the fact that the same version number was used in all
SSH requests (Mahoney & Chan, 2003) . Thus, the payload related artifacts did not
constitute a barrier to the use of the data set in the work reported here.
The critique by McHugh (2000) was more qualitative than quantitative but neither
his critique nor that of Mahoney and Chan (2003) identified simulation artifacts in the
data portion of malicious packets.
The data set used for validation is the largest publicly-available one which has the
payload portion intact. The other large data sets have had the payload portion stripped to
protect privacy (Mahoney & Chan, 2003). Because the research reported here focuses
entirely on the payload data, and as no anomalies have been identified in the payload
data, the MIT/DARPA IDEval data set is a suitable test vehicle for the reported research.
In spite of criticism, the MIT/DARPA IDEval data set continues to be used by others,
including Tavallaee et al. (2010) and Löf and Nelson (2010). The use of a publiclyavailable data set will allow interested researchers to replicate and verify the results that
are reported here.
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Limitations and Delimitations
Because this is a proof of concept demonstration, search for cellular automata that
can detect malicious patterns ceased when a rule that detects two such patterns was
discovered.
The demonstration system was implemented on a single processor personal
computer running standard software. For that reason, although complete parallelism is
possible in computing the next state of cellular automata when there is one computing
element per cell, that parallelism is not present in the demonstration. However, the
demonstration shows the ability to detect two distinct patterns in a single execution of the
cellular automaton and with a fixed number of cycles of the cellular automaton. That is
the principal level of parallelism in the system. Parallel execution of next states is the
second level; the next states of all cells can be computed simultaneously. Evaluating the
state of the cellular automaton involves examining each individual bit. Accomplishing
that in constant time requires a fully associative comparison. The time for determination
of state does not increase when more than one pattern is recognized.
It is important to note in the context of the reported research that there exist
attacks which cannot be recognized at all through inspection of network packets. One
example is the ping flood, in which the attacked node is overwhelmed by a large volume
of ICMP echo requests. The purpose is to saturate either the incoming network
connection or the processing power of the node under attack. Another is the SYN flood,
in which the attacker creates a large number of half-open TCP connections. The
attacker’s purpose is to exhaust the node resources used to account for connections in the
process of being established (Stallings & Brown, 2008). In the first case, any one of the
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flood of pings is indistinguishable from an innocent diagnostic ping intended to
determine whether the node is operational and reachable. As with pings, a single SYN
packet cannot, by itself, be determined to be part of an attack. In neither case does
inspection of the network packets in isolation reveal the malicious intent of the attacker.
These attacks must be detected or prevented using some mechanism other than the one
described here.
This research was not intended to result in an entire intrusion detection system.
Instead, it provides the proof of concept of one component of a distributed intrusion
detection system that can respond quickly to specific events, and an approximate pattern
matching system that can be implemented in a highly parallel fashion.
Summary
The ubiquitous network connectivity that arose at the beginning of the twentyfirst century means that information systems are potentially exposed to attack from
anywhere in the world. One method of detecting attacks is by their signatures, specific
bit patterns that characterize known attacks. An important consideration in signature
checking is the speed with which it can be accomplished. In order not to cause a
bottleneck, such checking must operate at the speed of the network connection. This
research has identified a mechanism that can check for two distinct signatures
simultaneously and, with a suitable number of processing elements, can operate in a
highly parallel fashion.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature
Introduction
Information security is characterized by three properties: confidentiality, integrity,
and availability. Each property describes a state or condition of an information asset
(Bishop, 2003). Confidentiality is achieved when information assets are not disclosed
other than to those who are, by policy, authorized to have access. Integrity addresses the
trustworthiness of information, and exists when information in an automated system
agrees with the source from which it was derived and has not been incorrectly altered or
destroyed. Availability means that information assets are accessible to authorized
persons when and where needed, with suitable response time (Stallings & Brown, 2008).
The confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information assets can be
compromised through accident or by malicious intent. One refers to an “attacker” in
cases of intentional attempts to compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability
of information assets. According to Stallings and Brown (2008), the goals of the attacker
are duals of the three properties of information security, namely disclosure, alteration,
and denial of availability.
McCumber (1991) identifies three states of information in addition to the three
properties. They are processing, transmission, and storage. The work described here
addresses information during processing, transmission, and a subset of storage. Only
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information in online storage is addressed; that is, information that is accessible through
the execution of instructions on a computer processor and without manual intervention.
According to Pfleeger and Pfleeger (2006), a computer system is secure when it
does what it is intended to do and nothing else. Technical security breaches are the result
of a system being forced to operate outside its design parameters. Thus, technical
security breaches are the result of errors in specification, design, or implementation.
However, it is extraordinarily difficult to build non-trivial systems of hardware and
software that are free of error (Stallings & Brown, 2008). It is necessary to compensate
for potential errors in specification, design, or implementation through other means.
Some attacks against information assets involve intrusions into computer systems.
An intrusion sometimes involves the introduction of executable instructions into a
computer system with the intent of causing disclosure, alteration, or denial of availability
(Solomon & Chapple, 2005) by executing actions contrary to the security policy of the
system. Such executable instructions are called malicious software or malware (Bishop,
2003). Widespread Internet connectivity has made introduction of malicious software
through network connections a frequent vector of such attacks. However, network
connectivity is not the only such vector. Intrusions through malicious software can also
be accomplished through portable storage devices if physical access is available
(Stallings & Brown, 2012).
Although there are still people who attempt to intrude into computer systems for
reasons of curiosity or notoriety, an important motivator is crime for financial gain (Hald
& Pedersen, 2012). Although bank robber Willie Sutton denied in his autobiography that
he robbed banks “because that’s where the money is,” (Sutton & Linn, 1976), that is
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clearly a motivator today. Losses are difficult to quantify, but estimates in the billions of
dollars have been given (Florêncio & Herley, 2011). Financial gain can be direct, such as
use of credit card numbers or bank account credentials, or indirect, such as through the
sale of stolen credentials or rental of botnet services (Egele et al., 2012). Use of intrusion
for indirect gain has resulted in a very large underground economy (Zhuge et al., 2009).
Another motivator mentioned by Hald and Pedersen (2012) is cyber warfare,
intrusion carried on using the resources of a national government to further that
government’s ends. Chen (2010) points to the Stuxnet worm as a probable example of
cyber warfare based on the narrow choice of targets and the sophistication of the
software. Governments may also employ malicious software for surveillance.
Malicious software can be categorized by its behavior or by its intended effect.
For example, the terms “worm” and “virus” describe behavior. A worm is malicious
software that is independent and self-propagating. A virus is self-propagating, but
attaches itself to other software. “Spyware” and “bot” describe the intended effect.
Spyware covertly retrieves information from the system under attack and sends it to the
attacker. A bot is software that allows for covert remote control of the system under
attack. The phrase can also refer to a system that is covertly remote controlled. A botnet
is a collection of such systems (Egele et al., 2012)
There are several mechanisms for attempting to detect malicious software which
are described in detail below. One common mechanism is to compare the incoming data
stream to bit patterns known to characterize an attack (Egele et al., 2012). This is called
signature detection. Signature detection is the prevalent approach in commercial antivirus scanners (Stallings & Brown, 2012). Authors of malicious software attempt to
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avoid signature detection by obscuring their software or changing it over time (Vinod et
al., 2009).
The research reported here encompasses intrusion detection, detection of
malicious software through recognition of signature patterns, cellular automata and their
use in pattern recognition in the presence of noise, and the evolution of cellular automata
using genetic algorithms. The literature of each of these subjects is reviewed here.
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection can be host-based, in which case events that cause protection
state changes in host computers are analyzed, or network-based, in which case data
transiting a network are analyzed (Pfleeger & Pfleeger, 2006). This research was focused
on network-based intrusion detection, in which network traffic is examined for
indications of malicious activity, although it is equally applicable to searching databases
or files.
Bishop (2003) defines intrusion detection as monitoring to detect attempts at
violating the security policies of a system, regardless of whether the attempt is successful.
According to Bishop, intrusion detection systems have four goals: detecting a variety of
intrusions, including novel forms of attack, detecting intrusions within an appropriate
time frame, presenting an easy-to-understand analysis, and discriminating accurately
between attacks and normal traffic.
Bishop’s remarks on timely detection are particularly relevant to this research.
He observes that not all intrusion attempts need to be detected in real time, but that they
must be detected in time to take appropriate action. This research was predicated on the
proposition that some kinds of events, namely those that can result in the compromise of
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a computing system within seconds or minutes, should be detected and prevented in near
real time if possible. Doing so can save the expense and difficulty of recovering a system
that is potentially compromised (Bishop, 2003).
One goal of research into intrusion detection has been that of improving
performance. Clark et al. (2004) describe a hardware platform for detecting and
preventing intrusions. In this context, prevention implies detection in real time. Their
research involved von Neumann architecture network processors coupled with microengine processors to run certain threads in parallel and a field programmable gate array
(FPGA) for pattern comparison. Otey et al. (2003) describe research into intrusion
detectors that are an integral part of network interface cards. Their algorithms run on von
Neumann-style processors. Sekar et al. (1999) attack the problem of improving
performance by improving pattern matching algorithms.
Another approach to improving performance is the use of content-addressable, or
associative, memory. Yu, Katz, and Lakshman (2004) describe gigabit rate pattern
matching hardware bases on ternary content-addressable memory, or TCAM. Each bit in
such a memory has three states, zero, one, and “do not care.” The latter state will match
either zero or one in the data packet. That allows for approximate string matching.
However, the position of the bits to be skipped must be known, and a successful match
depends on the position of the matching bits in the data packet.
Salmela et al. (2007) recognize the need for both good performance and the
ability to match multiple patterns simultaneously. In the absence of simultaneous
matching techniques, the time to analyze a packet becomes the product of the time to
check one pattern and the number of patterns. They address this problem using
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overlapping q-grams and report good performance even with large numbers of patterns.
Q-grams break a string into substrings, each of which is considered to be a single
semantic token. Overlapping q-grams are formed by taking a string of length q from each
consecutive position of the original text. In an example given by Salmela et al., an
overlapping q-gram of length two on the string “pony” produces the strings “po-on-ny.”
Zu et al. (2012) describe the use of regular expressions for intrusion detection.
Regular expressions can be evaluated using finite automata. They point out that the state
space of deterministic finite automats (DFA) expands rapidly to hundreds of thousands of
states as the number of patterns increases, making DFA impractical for intrusion
detection. Nondeterministic finite automata (NFA) can have more than one state
transition on an input character, which has the effect of reducing the state space. More
than one transition on an input character implies the possibility of multiple states being
simultaneously active. Zu et al. achieve the desired speed through the use of a GPU to
provide for parallel processing of multiple active states.
Q. Zhang et al. examine the problem of detecting encrypted network code. They
observe that the decryption routine itself must be directly executable, although it may be
obscured in a number of ways. The executable decryption code is often, but not always,
preceded by the NO-OP sled that is characteristic of buffer overflow attacks (Q. Zhang et
al., 2007).
J. Zhang et al. (2008) attempt to avoid false positives when checking signatures
for polymorphic worms through characterizing normal traffic. Their premise is that the
signature patterns in polymorphic worms are relatively small because a large part of the
code is deliberately masked. It is, therefore, possible that the same patterns could appear
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in normal traffic, resulting in false positives. They describe the characteristics of normal,
non-malicious traffic by identifying strings that occur frequently in normal traffic. They
call this a “white list.” They then develop signatures for malicious traffic by identifying
strings that occur frequently in the malicious traffic and are not on the white list. They
also analyze protocol characteristics, such as the traffic flow between source and
destination IP addresses. Having thus characterized malicious data, they then treat
normal network traffic as noise and attempt to distinguish the malicious data from the
noise.
Bishop (2003) describes three approaches to intrusion detection. Misuse
detection involves comparing signatures of known attacks against current activity. In the
case of network-based intrusion detection, this means network packets or sequences of
packets. Misuse detection can discriminate very precisely between patterns known to
represent attacks and other patterns. It will produce few false positives, but cannot detect
unknown types of attacks. Tavallaee (2009) observes that signature based detection is the
favored approach in current commercial intrusion detection products.
Misuse detection need not be based on explicit comparison of events to patterns.
Cannady (1998) describes training a neural network to recognize events characteristic of
misuse. Rhodes et al. (2000) apply Kohonen self-organizing maps to differentiate normal
and malicious traffic.
Anomaly modeling (Bishop, 2003) involves looking for deviations from a
statistical characterization of a normal operating environment. Unlike misuse detection,
anomaly modeling can detect previously unknown types of attacks, but at the cost of a
number of false positive indications that depend on the precision of the model.
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Specification-based detection (Bishop, 2003) compares current activity to a
formal specification of states “known not to be good” and reports exceptions. Properlymodeled specification-based detection should be relatively immune to false positives, but
cannot detect attacks outside its specification model.
Another trend in intrusion detection is distribution of the detection functions. In
some cases this is an outgrowth of a detection method, as with detection engines
integrated into network interface cards. However, distribution is also driven by the
improvements available through specialization. Rhodes et al. (2000) describe the idea of
a “monitor stack” organized analogously to a network protocol stack. The principle is
that misuse can best be detected at the appropriate protocol level. That drives
specialization and the gains from specialization drive distribution of detection efforts and
concepts like the monitor stack.
Brooks et al. (2002) describe a model of information flow based on heterogeneous
and rule-heterogeneous cellular automata and conjecture that this model can be used for
anomaly detection through flow modeling. The research reported here also seeks to
apply cellular automata to detect anomalies. However the automata used in this work are
much simpler, with the intent that they could be implemented in hardware or in software
suitable for execution on computers with a high degree of parallelism, such as graphics
processing units. The idea that a “normal” pattern might be recognized by a cellular
automaton rule represents a different approach, although similar to the white list of J.
Zhang et al. (2008).
Crowcroft et al. (2003) characterize the state of the Internet in about 2002 as
being composed of a 10Gb/s core infrastructure with an access infrastructure of at most
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100Mb/s Ethernet. They recognize a cycle in which access speeds increase, necessitating
an increase in core speeds. In 2003 they observed the beginning of a trend towards
gigabit access speeds. We are currently on the access speed part of the cycle, with access
speeds trending from the 100 Mbps connections of a few years ago to gigabit
connections.
If a goal is detection quickly enough to discard malicious packets and so prevent
intrusion, the bar is raised by the increase in access speeds. A reasonable assumption is
that most (but not all) intrusion attempts will come from outside. In that case, “real time”
means at the signaling speed of the access connection. Today, that means gigabit rates.
Current intrusion detection systems are operating at the edge of their capabilities. It will
be necessary to find improved mechanisms to safeguard the next generation Internet
(Otey et al., 2003).
Cellular Automata
A cellular automaton is a discrete, deterministic, dynamical system (Wolfram,
1984). It consists of a lattice, or “game board,” of n cells, an alphabet k of possible states
for each cell in the lattice, a generator function, and an initial condition. The lattice and
alphabet reflect the discrete nature of cellular automata. The generator function, also
called a rule, specifies the next state of each cell in terms of the current state of the cell
and the current states of its near neighbors (Wolfram, 2002). It is this property that
allows fully parallel implementation of cellular automata. Sommerhalder and
Westrhenen (1983) view one-dimensional cellular automata as a collection of Moore
model finite state machines, one for each cell of the cellular automaton. Such a
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collection of finite state machines can be directly implemented in hardware, although the
cellular automata used in this research were simulated in software.
“Near” is defined by a radius r. The generator function examines each cell and its
r neighbors on either side. The radius is generally small; cellular automata operate on
local interactions only. The cellular automaton described below has r = 1, so that the
generator function considers the cell itself and its left and right neighbors. The initial
condition is the set of states at time t0. Even extremely simple cellular automata such as
these can exhibit complex behavior (Wolfram, 1994).
Binary cellular automata are those with alphabet k = 2, only two possible states
per cell. Other numbers of states, or alphabets, are equally possible. Cellular automata
for which the lattice is one cell high by n cells wide are one-dimensional cellular
automata. A cellular automaton in which the number of states is different for different
cells is called heterogeneous. If different cells have different generator functions, the
cellular automaton is called rule-heterogeneous (Wolfram, 2002). Given these variations,
the descriptions of cellular automata can become quite complex.
The research described in this report focused on implementations that can take
advantage of parallel computing using simple computing elements, and so employed
binary, one-dimensional, rule-uniform cellular automata with r = 2.
A striking feature of cellular automata is that some of them are self-organizing.
Some cellular automata “evolve” to the same patterns even when given random and
differing initial states (Wolfram, 2002). Cellular automata constructed from such rules
exhibit a lack of sensitivity to initial conditions that may be interpreted as immunity to
noise in initial conditions (Wolfram, 2002). For that reason, a cellular automaton used in
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the way that is described in this report intrinsically does an approximate string search;
perturbation of a number of bits in the target does not significantly impair the ability of
the cellular automaton to recognize the pattern.
Cellular automata that reach a particular, recognizable state in this way are said to
relax, even though the pattern need not be repeating and need not converge to any
particular value (Wolfram, 2002). A state to which a cellular automaton relaxes is called
a basin of attraction by Ganguly et al. (2002). They point out that a particular cellular
automaton may have more than one basin of attraction, and in that way recognize more
than one pattern. In the trivial state of relaxation, each cell repeatedly produces either
zero or one. However, any identifiable pattern meets the definition of relaxation and of a
basin of attraction.
Other cellular automata are very sensitive to initial conditions; a small
perturbation in initial conditions can lead to large differences in results (Wolfram, 2002).
It is this sensitivity to initial conditions that has made possible the differentiation of
network packets reported here.
Wolfram (1994) describes a class of one-dimensional cellular automata in which
the alphabet is binary (0/1) and the generator function F is:

where a is the value of a cell in the cellular automaton, i is the position of the cell, and t is
a discrete time interval or generation number. This generator describes a rule for
producing the next generation of cells that looks only at the current cell and its left and
right neighbors, so r =1. Since the alphabet of this class of cellular automata is binary,
there are only eight possible inputs to computation of the next generation: 000, 001, …
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110, 111. Each specific rule is characterized by an eight-bit number, one output bit for
each of the possible input combinations. That means there are 28=256 distinct cellular
automata that can be described with this general function and a binary alphabet.
Wolfram’s (1994) convention of referring to these rules by their characteristic output
function has been widely adopted, so one speaks of rules zero to 255 for such a cellular
automaton.
Chaudhuri et al. (1997) describe how a generator function like that given by
Wolfram (1994) can be implemented with combinational logic and a state register, but
also show how the generator function can be implemented in hardware or software as a
table look-up. For example, the combinational logic for rule 90 is:

The same rule can be represented as a table look-up as follows:
Neighborhood:
Next state:

111
0

110
1

101
0

100
1

011
1

010
0

001
1

000
0

The “neighborhood” represents the bit whose next state is to be determined, together with
its left and right neighbors. The three bits of neighborhood can be used as an index into a
table that holds the next state. For cellular automata of r = 1, the neighborhood is three
bits and the table has eight entries, as shown. When r = 2, there are five bits and 32 table
entries. Note that the zero value of the neighborhood refers to the low-order bit of the
rule. The table can be implemented in software, as in this research, but it could also be
implemented in hardware as a control store.
Some of the cellular automaton rules examined by Wolfram (2002) are
symmetrical about one another, and some, like rule zero, degenerate immediately. There
are 88 distinct and interesting cellular automata of this type. If there were only 88, or
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even 256, possible binary, one-dimensional cellular automata, one could determine by
exhaustive search whether any of them can partition network packets into normal and
malicious categories. However, there are many other possible binary, one-dimensional
cellular automata. Looking at the two nearest neighbors on each side, r = 2, (five bits in
total) gives a generator function of five bits, 25 = 32 input values and 232 possible
combinations. In general, the number of bits in the rule space is b = 22r+1 and the number
of possible rules is 2b (Mitchell et al., 1996). Thus, one goes from 256 rules when r = 1
to 232 rules when r = 2 and 2128 rules when r = 3. Other generator function classes and
different combinations can raise the number of possible combinations exponentially.
Regardless of the choice of r, cellular automata consider only nearby cells. It is for
precisely this reason that the characteristics of malicious packets can be encoded in a
cellular automaton rule. It also makes imperative the use of an approach like genetic
algorithms; an exhaustive search of such a large rule space is impossible in a reasonable
amount of time (Mitchell et al., 1996).
Cellular Automata for Pattern Recognition
Although the use of cellular automata for pattern recognition dates back to
Smith’s work in 1971, there is also current research in the area, particularly with respect
to error correction, approximate matching, and the ability of a single cellular automaton
to detect two or more patterns. Each of these areas is relevant to the results reported here.
Chady and Poli (1997) worked with small feed-forward cellular automata. Feedforward cellular automata are two-dimensional cellular automata for which the update
rule allows propagation in only one direction. One can visualize such a cellular
automaton as a rectangle in which the input bits are applied on the left and the result or
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output bits appear on the right after a number of cycles. Chady and Poli applied small
(8×8 and 16×16) feed-forward cellular automata to associative memory look-ups in the
presence of noise. Their cellular automata can recognize up to four patterns with error
correction capability of up to 20% noise applied to the input. Their cellular automaton
rules were found using genetic algorithms, as is the case for this research.
Chady and Poli observe that the 8×8 cellular automaton performs better than the
16×16 version and conjecture that it is because the portion of the pattern analyzed by a
single cell is greater than the noise applied to the input (Chady & Poli, 1997).
Brewer (2008) shows that the propagation property for cellular neural networks
described by Chua and Yang (1988) also applies to cellular automata. The propagation
property states that, as the number of cycles increases, each cell of a cellular automaton is
influenced by an increasingly large area. This is a helpful counter to the conjecture of
Chady and Poli because, as the number of cycles of the cellular automaton increases,
each cell is influenced by an increasing portion of the input. The propagation property
does seem to suggest that the number of cycles needed for pattern recognition may
increase with increasing input sizes. For the research reported here, operation in four or
eight cycles was found to be effective.
More recent work by Saha et al. (2002), Maji et al. (2003), and Ganguly et al.
(2004) describe one-dimensional cellular automata that can recognize patterns in the
presence of noise. The cellular automata described in these papers are ruleheterogeneous, that is, each cell may have a different generation rule. Most rules appear
to be hand-crafted although the authors suggest finding appropriate rules using genetic
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algorithms. The paper by Saha is specific to the discussion of evolving such rules
through use of genetic algorithms.
Latif et al. (2010) have shown that a classification mechanism based on cellular
automata for functional magnetic resonance imaging brain scans produces better results
than singular value decomposition (SVD). The alphabet of the cellular automaton
consists of the voxels of the fMRI image and the transition rule is based on the voxel
distance of a cell’s adjacent neighbors. The cellular automaton approach also provides
better time performance than SVD. Because sorting the voxels is required, the cellular
automaton approach requires time O(nlog2n) while SVD requires O(n2).
Kundu and Roy (2010) suggested using cellular automata with multiple basins of
attraction as classifiers for Web pages. Their paper describes a classifier for a relatively
small lexicon and applies rule-heterogeneous cellular automata to the problem.
Brewer (2008) also points out that homogeneous cellular automata are translation
invariant; that is, the position of a feature in the input space will not affect how it is
processed. The implication is that rearrangement of the features of a malicious packet
may not prevent it from being recognized as such. Ganguly et al. (2004) observe that
“the time to recognize a pattern is independent of the number of patterns stored.” Adding
more signatures to be compared does not increase the time to perform the check provided
the number of cycles of the cellular automaton can be held constant.
Use of Genetic Algorithms to Evolve Cellular Automaton Rules
The generator function described in Wolfram (1994) and given earlier in this
paper defines 256 different cellular automata. Each rule can be specified as an eight-bit
number and permuting the number in some way generates a new rule.
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Matthew Cook (2004) showed that there exist cellular automata capable of
universal computation by showing that the cellular automaton defined by rule 110 is
equivalent to a universal Turing machine. According to Church’s conjecture, every
computable function can be computed by a Turing machine (Wood, 1987), so a proof that
a cellular automaton is equivalent to a universal Turing machine provides the strongest
possible evidence that the cellular automaton is capable of universal computation.
According to Crutchfield et al. (1998), even though there exist cellular automata
capable of universal computation, there is no satisfactory programming paradigm for
harnessing the inherent parallelism of cellular automata. Instead, programs for cellular
automata are discovered through three major approaches. The first is hand-crafting on an
ad hoc basis. The second is through the use of programs that simulate serial processes
without taking advantage of the inherent parallelism of cellular automata. Finally,
cellular automata for specific applications can be evolved using genetic algorithms. This
research has taken explicit advantage of the parallelism of cellular automata by using
genetic algorithms to evolve cellular automata that effectively classify malicious network
packets.
Mitchell et al. (1994) observed that a cellular automaton that considered a
neighborhood of seven cells could be represented as a 128-bit number. They considered
this number to be the chromosome to be manipulated by the genetic algorithm. The size
of the chromosome varies as 2b where b is the number of bits needed to specify the rule.
Even relatively large neighborhoods yield chromosomes of tractable size. A
neighborhood of eleven cells (r = 5, eleven bits, and 211 rules) can be specified using a
2,048 bit chromosome to explore the 22048 possible values. Notice also that a rule-set
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defining a neighborhood of n cells in a cellular automaton of given radius subsumes all
rules of neighborhoods of smaller sizes; it is only necessary to encode zeroes for those
combinations that are never used (Wolfram, 2002).
Mitchell et al. (1994) and Crutchfield et al. (1998) experimented with evolving
cellular automata to do density classification by permuting the characteristic number that
defines a cellular automaton’s rule. They used the hand-crafted Gács, Kurdyumov and
Levin (GKL) rule as a benchmark. The GKL rule has two basins of attraction; it relaxes
to all zeros or all ones. Mitchell et al. (1994) describe epochs of innovation where the
strategy of the genetic algorithm apparently changes. Although the cellular automaton
produced by the genetic algorithm got successively better at density classification, it
never achieved the effectiveness of the GKL rule. Mitchell et al. (1994) point out that the
GKL rule was not invented for density classification; it was part of a study of phase
transition and computation in one dimension.
The fitness function used by Mitchell et al. (1994) is that the cellular automaton
relaxes to all ones when the input density is over one half and to all zeros otherwise. This
is a very stringent condition. Cellular automata may relax to many other identifiable
states. It is not even required that such a cellular automaton relax at all, provided it
achieves a state that can be recognized easily.
The experiments reported here were designed to take advantage of the two
sources of parallelism described above: the fact that a single cellular automaton is
capable of recognizing more than one pattern in a single set of operations of the cellular
automaton, and the fact that cellular automata are inherently parallel mechanisms that can
be readily implemented using parallel processing hardware.
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Realization of Cellular Automata in Software or Hardware
A cellular automaton can be realized in software by programming the generator
function as described by Wolfram (1994) and iterating over the cells of the cellular
automaton, and that is the approach used in the proof of concept reported here. However,
doing so essentially serializes what should be a highly parallel operation. The parallelism
can be preserved if a cellular automaton of n cells is evaluated on a computer with n
processing elements because it is of the nature of a cellular automaton that the successor
to each cell can be evaluated independently of the others (Sarkar, 2000). That suggests
the possibility of a realization of the cellular automaton in a way that takes full advantage
of the parallelism. Such a cellular automaton would require 12,000 computing elements
to process a 1,500 byte Ethernet packet. Modern graphics cards include thousands of
graphics processing units (GPUs). Programming paradigms are available to take
advantage of the large number of GPUs and to increase the number of GPUs available by
using more than one graphics card (Sanders & Kandrot, 2011). An implementation with
12,000 computing elements is very much within reach using commercial hardware. Such
an implementation is also applicable to searching files or databases for target patterns.
Even rule-heterogeneous cellular automata with relatively large radii are simple
and regular. Binary, one-dimensional cellular automata are the simplest and most regular
of all. The next state of any cell can be computed with combinational logic consisting of
only a few gates. Each computing element takes n bits of input, determined by the radius
of the cellular automaton, and produces a single bit of output, the next state.
Only a single bit of state storage is needed per cell (Porter & Bergmann, 1999).
This need not be a conventional memory; all that is needed is a latch, a bi-stable device
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capable of storing a single bit (Katz, 1994). The next state of every cell can be computed
simultaneously. The duration of the clock cycle is dictated only by the combinational
logic settling time. Thus, it is reasonable to project that a cycle of such a cellular
automaton could be completed in a few nanoseconds or less.
These characteristics make simple cellular automata ideal for implementation in
very large scale integration. Chaudhuri et al. (1997) describe, among many other
applications, the use of cellular automata to implement built-in self-test functions for
other VLSI circuits. Because of the small demands for power and chip area made by
cellular automata, it would be practical to include such an automaton in the network
processing chips of network interface cards. On-chip attachment to the de-serialization
shift register would make the input packet available to set an initial condition with very
little circuitry and no time penalty. A stand-alone implementation could be produced
using an application specific integrated circuit (ASIC).
For prototypes or lower volumes, an alternative is the field programmable gate
array, or FPGA. Porter and Bergmann (1999) describe the use of cellular automata
implemented in FPGAs for evaluating fitness functions in genetic algorithm processing.
Clark et al. (2004) and Singaraju et al. (2005) incorporated FPGA hardware in their
hardware-based intrusion detector. An FPGA implementation of cellular automata was
described by Sommerhalder and Westrhenen (1983).
Regardless of whether ASIC, VLSI, or FPGA technology is chosen, an important
feature of a hardware-based cellular automaton is that it can be made reconfigurable if a
control store consisting of a few bits per cell is provided. The size of the control store is
determined by the maximum radius of the cellular automaton. A cellular automaton with
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r=2 has 25=32 possible input states, so a 32 bit control store is needed. If an input to the
generator function is provided for each of the neighbors of a particular cell, AND gates
connected to appropriate bits of the control store can select which neighbors participate in
the generation function. In such a design, the control store is used only to drive
combinational circuits, and not as a conventional memory, so there is no memory cycle
and no time penalty other than one additional gate delay to making the cellular automaton
reconfigurable (Clark et al., 2004).
The ability to reconfigure a hardware cellular automaton means that if a more
effective pattern matching rule is developed, hardware already in the field could be
upgraded to the newest configuration. A possible disadvantage is that the control store
itself must now be protected from attack.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
Introduction
A series of experiments was conducted during the development of the idea paper
for this research to validate that at least some types of malicious network packets can, in
fact, be discriminated from ordinary network traffic using cellular automata. Wolfram
(1994) uses k to refer to the number of values possible for a cell in a cellular automaton,
and r to refer to the number of adjacent cells that participate in computation of the next
state. A binary cellular automaton has k = 2. When r = 1, the cell and its immediate left
and right neighbors participate in the computation of the next state.
The preliminary experiments were confined to cellular automata of form k = 2 and
r = 1. There are 256 such cellular automata (Wolfram, 1994), a sufficiently small number
to allow for exhaustive testing. A cellular automaton can be considered to be linear, in
which case the cells before the first and after the last are assumed to contain zeros, or
circular, in which case the first and last cells are assumed to be adjacent (Wolfram, 1994).
A one-dimensional cellular automaton simulator of 80 cells and capable of
displaying 80 cycles was programmed. The simulator took parameters of rule, initial
state, and whether the cellular automaton was linear or circular. The rule is specified as a
decimal number 0...255, each representing one of the 256 possible rules for k = 2 and r =
1. The initial state is entered as up to 10 pairs of hexadecimal digits. Hexadecimal input
was chosen to allow for binary data in the packets to be examined.
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The two attacks simulated were a buffer overflow attack and the backslash attack
against an Apache HTTP server.
Detection was deemed to be successful if the cellular automaton reached a
detectable state when presented with a packet containing the attack signature, and not for
other packets.
Because it was easy to do so, all 256 possible one-dimensional cellular automata
of type k = 2 and r = 1 were tested. Class 1 cellular automata are those that quickly reach
a stable state regardless of input (Wolfram, 2002). As expected, the class 1 cellular
automata and several others, such as the identity rule (rule 204) were not useful in
differentiating potentially malicious packets from others. However, other rules gave
more hopeful results.
The first test was for a simulated buffer overflow attack. For testing purposes, it
was assumed that the attack is characterized by a “NO-OP sled” of four or more i86 nooperation instructions, hexadecimal 90 (Berghel, 2003).
Rule 90, which Wolfram (1994) classifies as an additive class 3 rule, produced a
line of one-bits in the third cycle when presented with a string of hexadecimal 90. Not
surprisingly, it reacted the same way when presented with a string of hexadecimal 09, but
did not react in this fashion for other repeated values, including hexadecimal 80 and A0.
Thus, rule 90 was shown to indicate the presence of hexadecimal 90, and so to indicate
the presence of the NO-OP sled, but gave a false indication if confronted with hexadecimal
09. Rule 94 behaved similarly.
At first inspection, rule 102 also appeared to behave similarly. However, what
was being detected was repetition, and not a specific sequence of characters. Rule 104
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similarly detected repeating characters. Rule 126 appeared to detect any repeating
pattern.
Rule 129 built an inverted triangle of all one-bits under the part of the packet
containing hexadecimal 90 in the fifth cycle. That area was all zeros in the previous
cycle. Further, the left bits of the pattern were discernibly different between 90 and 09 if
the digit to the left is non-zero. Thus, rule 129 detected the NO-OP sled with fewer false
positives than rule 90. Rule 161 behaved similarly to rule 129.
A second round of preliminary experiments tested data from the backslash attack.
This attack is effective against some HTTP implementations on operating systems that
use the backslash as a path delimiter, e.g. Microsoft systems, and is not the same as the
“back attack” discussed later. It depends upon the use of backslash characters to traverse
the file system tree to reach areas outside the server’s document root. The backslash
characters can be explicit or URL-encoded. The ten-byte string, “a.u\..\..\” was tested
against the 256 cellular automata. Rule 183 detected this pattern by producing a very
high ones-density in the area of the backslash-dot data in cycle four. This rule was
effective for both linear and circular cellular automata.
When the backslashes were URL-encoded, that is, represented as %5C, rule 183
again produced a high density of one-bits in cycle four. In addition, rule 62 produced a
high density of one-bits in cycle 1. Other encodings of the backslash attack are possible,
for example, %255C where %25 encodes the percent sign (Mahoney & Chan, 2003).
Only the two encodings mentioned above were tested.
The preliminary testing described above tested patterns associated with attacks
using the simplest possible binary, one-dimensional cellular automata, namely those with
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r = 1. The actions of the cellular automata were not codified in recognition rules. The
tests did not recognize actual attack signatures nor was there any attempt to recognize
more than one pattern with a single cellular automaton rule. Rather, those tests provided
motivation for the research reported here.
The principal goal of the research reported here was the discovery of cellular
automaton rules that can distinguish malicious traffic within the context of a narrow
definition of “malicious packet” and for more than one kind of malicious packets.
Discovery of two such rules, as reported below, establish the proof of concept. The
resulting mechanism can be used for either offline searching or real-time identification of
the specified patterns.
As explained in the research methodology below, the experimentation reported
here was conducted with a rule-uniform, binary, one-dimensional, linear cellular
automaton. Much more complex cellular automata are possible, but the research
objective was to discover rules that could later be implemented readily in hardware or
using parallel processor computers. That objective implied a simple cellular automaton
and an evaluation function that could be computed in a fully-associative manner, for
example, using only combinational logic.
Overview of Research Methodology
The research approach used was construction of software prototypes and
demonstration that the prototypes addressed the research questions outlined in Chapter 1
above (Baskerville et al., 2009). Experimentation concluded successfully with a proof of
concept implementation of a cellular automaton that could detect either of two actual
attacks from the experimental data set.
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Wolfram (1994) and others described the parallel evaluation of cellular automata.
That parallelism is important in a fully-functioning detector, but the work of others made
it unnecessary to demonstrate it experimentally. Instead, a software implementation was
used to demonstrate that the concept was viable.
Because the use of genetic algorithms to find suitable cellular automata is part of
developing a detector, not a part of its operation, it should remain a software component
even if a hardware-based detector were developed. The implementation in hardware of
the detector is left for future research.
This research was conducted in four phases. Phase one was the specification and
establishment of test data. Both normal and malicious test data packets were taken from
the DARPA Intrusion Detection System Evaluation data for 1998, described by Haines
(2001). The suitability of this data was discussed in Chapter 1. This is the same type of
test data set used by Rhodes et al. (2000) and others and was chosen for this project
expressly because it has already been shown that it is possible to distinguish between
normal traffic of this type and malicious traffic. What was tested here is the ability to
achieve similar results using a cellular automaton as the detector.
Phase two was implementation of the cellular automaton and genetic algorithm
test beds. The cellular automaton test bed was produced first. Experimentation began
with the simplest type of binary, rule-uniform, linear cellular automaton. Initial testing
was performed using binary, rule-uniform, linear cellular automata with r = 1 and 256
cells. This is the same configuration used by Wolfram (2002), and correctness of the
implementation was confirmed by duplicating several of Wolfram’s results.
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The preliminary experiments described above had shown promise in detecting
malicious network packets, but also showed that a cellular automaton with r = 1 was not
sufficient to the task. The experiments described here began with a binary, rule-uniform,
linear cellular automaton with r = 2, with the intention of trying successively larger
values for r until a successful rule was found. It was not necessary to go beyond r = 2.
This research has shown that a cellular automaton of r = 2 can reliably detect the two
malicious packets selected from the test data. Had that not been the case, further
experimentation would have been conducted using r = 3 or with other forms or cellular
automata. Recommendations are in Chapter 5.
The software used for genetic algorithm development was JGAP, the Java Genetic
Algorithm Program, developed by Klaus Meffert, Neil Rotstan, and others (Hall, 2013).
It was chosen over other genetic algorithm platforms for a number of reasons. It is under
active development, the version that was used for this research having been released in
April, 2012. It is compatible with current releases of the Java platform. It is free
software, licensed under the Free Software Foundation’s lesser GPL and available from
SourceForge. Most important, it is highly modular, released as source code as well as
compiled classes, and amenable to modification by the researcher. The JGAP fitness
function is a class that receives a chromosome and returns a fitness number. The fitness
function class was developed in Java as part of this research and is described below.
In the default configuration of JGAP, the crossover operation randomly selects
35% of the population and produces two new individuals from each crossover operation,
using a random crossover point. By default, mutation is applied to 1/12 of the
population, so the probability of a gene being mutated is 1/12 × p × c where p represents
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the population size and c represents the chromosome size (Hall, 2013). The selector is
elitist and returns the top 90% of the population as ranked by fitness. After selection, the
top 10% of elements by fitness are cloned to return the population size to 100% (Hall,
2013).
The default values supplied by JGAP were used in these experiments. The
chromosome used consisted of a single gene, the cellular automaton rule to be evaluated.
The datatype of the gene was defined to be a 32-bit integer with a range of –231 to
+231−1, allowing all 32 bits to be varied. The population size was set to 100 and the
number of evolutions was set to 50. Initial populations were selected randomly by JGAP.
As there was only one gene in the chromosome used, crossover is not meaningful in the
experiments reported here. The fitness function used was developed for this research and
is described below.
Although parallel implementations of genetic algorithms are possible
(Shonkwiler, 1993), parallelism in the operation of the genetic algorithm engine was not
required because the operation of the genetic algorithm is not a part of the actual detector,
only a tool to find suitable cellular automata. Therefore, performance of the genetic
algorithm is not relevant to the operational performance of the pattern matching engine.
Each run of the genetic algorithm took 45 to 60 seconds on the equipment used.
The third phase of research was development of a fitness function. Previous
work, such as the density classification work by Crutchfield et al. (1998), used relaxation
to a state of all ones or a state of all zeroes after a specified number of iterations, in their
case, 320. This is quite a restrictive measure. Sarkar (2000) suggested that a single bit is
sufficient to represent an accepting or rejecting state, provided it is reliably on or off.
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Although fitness functions could possibly have been determined by cluster
analysis, the only suitable functions are those that can be computed by combinational
logic or direct comparison. That follows from the research goal of finding an approach
that would later be suitable for implementation in a highly parallel fashion.
The first attempt at a fitness function selected for a cellular automaton that
generated high ones densities for target packets and much lower ones densities for
packets not in the target population. Subsequent refinement produced a fitness function
that produced a particular range of ones densities for the target packets and ones densities
outside that range for packets not in the target population.
The fourth phase was testing the cellular automaton rules, evaluation of their
effectiveness, and iterative refinement of the fitness function. Inputs to the test runs were
a cellular automaton rule and associated evaluation rule, a cycle limit, and data packets
from the MIT/DARPA IDEval data set. Initial testing was performed using only the
Friday, week two test data of the IDEval data set. The test bed program read the entire
data set and evaluated each packet according to the cellular automaton rule and also using
string comparison rules hand-crafted to detect the specific attacks chosen for the
demonstration. Use of such string comparisons was necessary to allow evaluation of the
effectiveness of the cellular automaton as detector by providing an independent check
against the data. Initial experiments were performed using the back attack packets from
the Friday week two data of the training data set. When back attack packets could be
detected reliably, the IMAP attack packet from the same data set was added.
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Specific Research Approach
The MIT/DARPA IDEval data set from 1998 was used as the source of test data.
Rationale for selection of that data set has been described in Chapter 1. The data set itself
is described in Haines (2001) and in Lippmann (2000).
The JGAP program was installed and tested using the makeChange example fitness
function that is provided with JGAP. A cellular automaton simulator program using the
table look-up approach described in Chapter 3 was written and validated by duplicating
several of Wolfram’s (2002) results using cellular automata with r = 1. Once validated,
the cellular automaton simulator was extended to 12,000 cells, representing the 1,500
bytes of an Ethernet packet, and radius r = 2. Although the cellular automaton
accommodates a full 1,500 byte Ethernet packet, only the payload data is used for pattern
matching.
Because the chosen test data are in TCPDUMP2 format (Haines et al., 2001), Java
programming to read that format was required. The most direct approach appeared to be
the use of the SJPCAP program, published anonymously on Google Code. Testing showed
that SJPCAP did not correctly account for whether the files to be parsed stored integers in
big endian or little endian format, and in fact, mixed modes between 16 bit numbers
(little endian) and 32 bit numbers (big endian). According to Mahoney (2003), some of
the MIT/DARPA IDEval files are in big endian format and some are in little endian
format. It was necessary to correct SJPCAP to handle endian-ness properly based on the
“magic number,” 0xA1B2C3D4, that is included for that purpose in the global header

2

TCPDUMP and Ethereal, later renamed Wireshark, are utility programs for capturing network
traffic, saving files of captured traffic, and examining such files. They are described and compared by
Fuentes (2005).
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found in TCPDUMP files. There was already a defect report about conversion of shortInt
being little endian on the Google Code page for SJPCAP. As a result of this research, the
Google Code page has been updated with a brief discussion of endian-ness of input files
and correct use of the “magic number.”
Characteristics of the Malicious Packets
Two types of malicious, or attack, packets were chosen for experimentation.
They are called “back attack” and “IMAP attack” in Lippmann (2000) and in the
MIT/DARPA documentation. Attack packets in the Friday, week 2 training data set were
inspected with Wireshark to determine their characteristics.
Each IMAP attack pattern used in this research was a single packet consisting of
the string “301 LOGIN” followed by 0x22 and the series of 0x90 bytes that characterize
the NO-OP sled of a buffer overflow attack. Shell code following the NO-OP sled leads to a
root compromise. The IMAP attack packet used in the genetic algorithm was packet
number 175,454 from the Friday, week two training data. That is the only IMAP attack
packet in that particular data file.
The back attack is a denial of service attack effective against versions of the
Apache web server in use at the time. Despite the name of the attack, the 0x2f character
is the forward slash. The back attack consists of two slightly different types of packets:
initial packets and continuation packets. Initial packets consist of the string “GET /cgibin” with the remainder of the packet filled with 0x2f characters to a total of 1,460 bytes.
Continuation packets consist of HTTP continuations with up to 1,460 bytes of 0x2f
characters. When a network attack consists of multiple packets, as with the back attack,
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it is important to detect the first packet so that it and subsequent packets of the attack can
be blocked.
Non-Target Packets
Two packets were chosen arbitrarily from the Friday, week two training data as
“non-target” or non-malicious packets used for comparison in the genetic algorithm. The
first was packet number 825,453, a relatively short HTTP GET packet. The TCP packet
length was 328 bytes. The second was packet number 1,819, a full-length packet of text
HTML markup.
Development of Fitness Functions
Although the fitness function was refined iteratively during experimentation, all
fitness functions used were based on the ones density of the cellular automaton after a
predefined number of cycles. Only binary (k = 2) cellular automata were tested, so the
ones density is the number of one-bits in the cellular automaton’s cells after the final
cycle divided by the number of cells. It is important to note that for the rules which were
developed, the packets under test are of variable length, from a few bytes to 1,460 bytes.
The cellular automaton under test was of fixed size, 12,000 cells, equivalent to the 1,500
byte size of an Ethernet frame. When a packet is loaded into the cellular automaton,
remaining bits on the right are filled with zeros. The ones density calculation is over all
12,000 bits of the cellular automaton, and not over the area defined by the packet. The
propagation property described by Brewer (2008) says that, as the number of cycles of a
cellular automaton increases, the number of cells influenced by each initial bit also
increases. After some number of cycles, the fact that a portion of the cellular automaton
was filled with zeros is much less significant.
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It is not enough for the cellular automaton to reach an identifiable state in the
presence of a target packet. It must also reach some distinctly different state in the
presence of non-target packets. So, cellular automata must be tested by the fitness
function against both target and non-target samples from the data set. Development of
fitness functions began with the hypothesis that the ones density of target packets would
be different from the ones density of other packets. Experimentation confirmed that
hypothesis for the two types of target packets tested.
Initial testing was conducted using only a back attack packet and a fitness
function that attempted to find a rule that produced a ones density of less than 0.1 or
greater than 0.9, i.e. nearly all ones or nearly all zeros for the target packets, and a density
between 0.1 and 0.9 for the non-target packets. The same cellular automaton Java class
used for pattern matching was used to determine densities in the fitness function. The
number of cycles was adjusted iteratively, starting with 64 cycles and adjusting
downward. A fitness function with ones density of target packets less than 0.1 or greater
than 0.9 proved to be ineffective when tested against the full data set.
The first refinement was to look only for very dense configurations of the cellular
automaton, with ones densities > 0.9 for the target packets and less for non-target
packets. Although this appears to be more restrictive than the first fitness criterion, the
genetic algorithm generated more effective cellular automaton rules.
A fitness function based on the average Hamming distance between target and
non-target packets after operation of the cellular automaton was considered. This
approach was discarded because of the computational effort needed to evaluate the result.
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The fitness function that was adopted for the experimental phase was a density
band approach. The assumption that the target packets would have a ones density
different from that of the non-target packets was carried forward. The difference from
previous attempts was the hypothesis that the target packets would occupy a density
range of Tmin to Tmax, with few or no non-target packets also generating densities within
that range. The fitness function also computed Nmin and Nmax, the minimum and
maximum ones densities of the non-target packets. Using this approach, the genetic
algorithm generated the cellular automaton rules discussed in the next chapter. The
fitness function used was Tmin – Nmax for Nmax < Tmin and Nmin – Tmax for Tmax < Nmin with
the added condition that no non-target’s ones density be allowed to fall between Tmin and
Tmax. If that occurred, fitness was set to zero. This revision of the fitness function
differentiates ones density of target packets from that of non-target packets, but without
the artificial high or low density requirement of the prior attempts. In addition to
computing a fitness number, the fitness function logged the density values for later use.
Testing of Generated Cellular Automaton Rules
All IDEval test data containing either back or IMAP attacks similar to the packets
selected for testing were used for testing. Each day’s TCPDUMP file was first scanned by a
program that counted and identified the two attacks under study using hand-crafted string
comparison rules. That provided comparative data for evaluation of the effectiveness of
the cellular automaton rules. The IMAP attacks were identified by looking for “301
LOGIN” in the first bytes of the packet, followed by 0x22 and five bytes of 0x90. Back
attack initial packets were identified by checking for the string “GET /cgi-bin/” followed
by only 0x2f characters to the end of the packet. Continuation packets contain only the
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0x2f character; generally the entire packet is filled, but this was observed not to happen
always. In particular, the final continuation packet was often not filled. Early in the
experimental phase, the classification code was merged into the program used to test the
cellular automata filters, rendering the separate classification program unnecessary.
Once the data files were characterized, the cellular automaton rules generated by
the genetic algorithm were tested using a program that read the MIT/DARPA IDEval
data and evaluated each packet in two ways. The first evaluation was based on the ones
density classification into target or non-target packets. Experimentation showed that
most rules performed better with a single comparison of ones density to the upper limit,
rather than comparing for both upper and lower limits. Each packet was then evaluated
according to the manual rules described above. Packets classified as target or malicious
packets according to ones density but not identified by one of the manual classification
rules were counted as false positives. Packets identified by the manual classification
rules but not by the ones density rule were counted as false negatives and, for back attack
packets, further divided according to the rules above. Because the two attacks are based
on TCP packets, only TCP packets were evaluated. Similarly, because the two attacks
were external attacks, only packets entering the test network from outside were evaluated.
Incoming packets were identified as those not on the list of internal addresses provided
with the IDEval data.
To check a packet for the presence of one of the patterns in the pattern set, the
payload portion of the packet was used to establish the initial state of the cellular
automaton. Bits of the cellular automaton not initialized from the payload were filled
with zeros. The cellular automaton was allowed to operate for the number of cycles
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identified during determination of the fitness value. During operation, the next state of
each bit was determined by using the current state of that bit and its two left and two right
neighbors, for a total of five bits. That five-bit number was used as an address for a table
look up, as described on page 22. After the specified number of cycles, the ones density
of the cellular automaton was determined by counting the one bits of the state vector. If
the ones density was less than or equal to the target maximum density for the rule under
test, the packet was determined to have matched a pattern in the pattern set. The rules
tested, their fitness factors, and the density values for both strict and relaxed comparison
are shown in Table 16. Detailed results for each rule tested are shown in Table 2 through
Table 13.
Operation of the cellular automaton is visualized in Figures 1, 2, and 3. The rule
used is 1205310289. In order to produce a visualization that fits the page, only 96 bits of
the cellular automaton are shown. In Figure 1, the cellular automaton is initialized with
the first 96 bits of the payload portion of packet 1,819 of the Friday, week two training
data, representing a non-target packet. The initial ones density is 0.520. The behavior of
the cellular automaton is apparently chaotic, producing no identifiable pattern. The
cellular automaton has a ones density of 0.542 in cycles one, two, and three. In cycle
four, the last cycle for rule 1205312089, the density is 0.406, which is greater than the
threshold density for that rule (see Table 16) with the result that the data do not match
either pattern.
Figure 2 shows the same 96 bits, initialized with 0x2f characters, representing a
back attack packet. Initial ones density is 0.625. After two cycles, a clear pattern of four
zero bits followed by four one bits emerges. The density after cycle two is 0.479. In
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cycle three, the pattern becomes alternating ones and zeros and the density is 0.510. In
cycle four, nearly every bit is zero, the density is 0.073, and the packet is identified as
matching a target pattern in the pattern set.
Figure 3 demonstrates the initialization of the cellular automaton with 0x90
characters, representing the IMAP attack. The initial ones density is 0.250, which is below
the threshold for selection. However, the initial density is not used in the algorithm. By
cycle two, the same pattern of four zero bits followed by four one bits has emerged; the
density is 0.489. In cycle three the pattern again becomes alternating ones and zeros with
a density of 0.500. In cycle four, nearly every bit is zero, the density is 0.042, and the
packet is identified as matching a target pattern in the pattern set.
The problem addressed by this research is one of approximate string matching; a
certain number of incorrect matches are to be expected. The accuracy of such matching
can be presented as sensitivity and specificity. The sensitivity of a test is the number of
cases correctly identified divided by the total number of instances of the target value in
the population tested. The specificity of a test is the proportion of true negatives divided
by the total number of non-target instances in the population tested. False positives are
1 – specificity, and false negatives are 1 – sensitivity (Jaeschke et al., 2006). The
classification scheme described above provided the measures of sensitivity and
specificity given in Chapter 4.
Evaluating Tolerance for Perturbation
Each cellular automaton rule tested was also evaluated for sensitivity to
perturbation, or noise. This was accomplished by taking a single sample packet for the
back attack and the IMAP attack and randomly inverting bits using sampling with
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replacement. From one percent to 25% of bits were modified, in steps of one percent.
Cases where the ones density produced by operation of the cellular automaton was
outside the range generated by the genetic algorithm were recorded. The number of bits
changed while still remaining within the specified ones density was expressed as a
fraction of total bits in the packet.
Experiment showed that the IMAP packet was the determining factor in
establishing the target maximum ones density. Even a small perturbation of the IMAP
packet often exceeded the density bound. To compensate for this, the density bound was
relaxed by adding 25%, determined by experiment, of the distance between the target
band and the non-target band. The perturbation tests performed prior to adding the
tolerance band are not reported here. Tests of the sensitivity and specificity of the
generated rules were re-run, and both sets of results are reported here.
The IMAP attack consists of a single packet, and the packet used for operation of
the genetic algorithm was also used for testing sensitivity to perturbation. The back
attack consists of multiple packets; only the initial packet was tested for perturbation.
The basis of that decision was that detecting the initial packet is the requirement for
identifying the attack.
Resources Used
All research described here was completed with a standard office computer and
can be readily duplicated without special equipment. The operating system used was
Windows XP-SP3 with current Microsoft patches as of the time of the experiments. The
programming language was Java, using the Java 7 runtime environment and the jGRASP
development environment. Genetic algorithm functions were performed by JGAP 3.6.2.
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The test data were obtained from the MIT IDEval pages in TCPDUMP format. Wireshark
version 1.4.15 was used to extract test cases and when it was necessary to examine the
test data directly. Microsoft Excel 2007 was used to import the text files of false
positives and false negatives produced by the experiments. Conversion from the binary
TCPDUMP

format to Java objects used SJPCAP, a program contributed anonymously to

Google Code, and which received substantial revision by the author to handle the MIT
IDEval data as described above. All other programming was done in Java by the author.
Version control was accomplished by copying all programming files to directories
named using month, day, and year prior to making changes to the programming. A
laboratory notebook of the results of the experimental phase experiments was recorded in
a word processing document, most recent entry first.
Summary
The research approach used was prototype and demonstration. Genetic algorithm
functionality was provided by JGAP, a standard genetic algorithm implementation with
substantial opportunity for customization. Only the size of the initial population, the
datatype of the single chromosome, and the fitness function were customized. The
fitness functions and cellular automaton evaluation programs were coded in Java by the
author.
After a suitable fitness function was devised, operation of the genetic algorithm
produced cellular automaton rules that were able to identify the two types of malicious
packets selected for testing from the rest of the packet population. There were no false
positives in the test data. No initial packets from either attack were missed. False
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negatives were all back attack continuation packets. Detailed results are given in the next
chapter.
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Chapter 4
Results
Data Analysis
Data were collected from four of the training data sets and all ten of the testing
data sets of the MIT/DARPA IDEval 1998 data corpus. Two passes were made through
the data. The first pass used a strict bound on ones density as determined by the genetic
algorithm. The second pass used a relaxed density rule, in which the density boundary
for selection was relaxed by 25% of the difference between the target density bound and
the non-target density bound. The rationale for the relaxed density rule is to improve
performance in the presence of noise or perturbation, as explained in Chapter 3.
Six cellular automaton rules were tested. Rule −369784237 3 with a fitness of
0.8530 was the first rule generated by the genetic algorithm using the final version of the
fitness function, and was used as a benchmark for most subsequent testing. The
remaining rules were chosen in order of their fitness values from subsequent runs of the
genetic algorithm using a cycle parameter of four. The rules and their fitness values are
given in Table 16.
Most of the data collected during the experiments is presented in Tables 1 – 15; a
complete list of data items collected is in Table 17. Some items are omitted from this
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This report follows the convention established by Wolfram (1994) in representing cellular
automaton rules as decimal integers. The programming language used for these experiments was Java, and
the rules were represented as signed integers. A rule expressed as a negative integer indicates that the
leftmost bit is one.
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report because they are not relevant to the analysis, and one data item is omitted because
it exhibited no variation. Data on detection of IMAP attack packets is omitted from the
tables because there were only two such packets in the corpus of data, and all six rules
detected them without false negatives. Total number of packets read is omitted from the
tables because, although relevant to validating the correct operation of the experimental
programs, it is not relevant to the analysis of the effectiveness of cellular automata as
recognizers of multiple patterns. Only TCP packets were screened by the cellular
automaton.
Desired Outcomes
There are four characteristics that together characterize successful operation of a
rule for detection of the target packets. They are minimal false negative results, minimal
false positive results, few cellular automaton cycles to reach an accepting state, and
tolerance for noise or perturbation. Of those, minimizing false negatives is arguably the
most important. Whether the cellular automaton is used for initial screening or as the
only detector, a false negative means that target data will be missed.
False positives mean that either subsequent screening by another method is
required or that there will be false alarms. The best rule (−369784237, see Table 2)
produced 1,215 false positives on data for fourteen days, or an average of 87 false alarms
each day. Such a false alarm rate indicates that some post-screening mechanism would
be required to limit false alarms.
Although cellular automata operate in constant time both with respect to the
number of cells (Sarkar, 2000) and, as shown by this research, with respect to the number
of patterns detected, the number of cycles required to reach an accepting state does
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influence performance. Best performance comes from minimizing the number of cycles.
Ability to function correctly in the presence of noise means that data different from the
target pattern, but similar, can be detected reliably.
Performance of the Rules under Test
An important result of these experiments is that each rule tested recognized every
instance of the IMAP attack and also every instance of the back attack initial packet. The
absence of false negatives means no target data was missed by any of the cellular
automaton rules. Although there were false negatives for back attack continuation
packets, those are not relevant to the information security application. Detecting the
initial packet would enable protective action prior to any of the continuation packets
being processed. Back attack continuation packets were not part of the sample data
processed by the genetic algorithm, and so were expected to be recognized only to the
extent that they are similar to the back attack initial packets.
Best recognition was exhibited by rule −369784237 (Tables 2 and 8), which
required eight cycles to reach an accepting state. Changing from strict to relaxed density
boundaries reduced the number of false negative continuation packets by 15 but increased
the number of false positives by 95 cases, as shown in Table 14. Rule 1205312089
produced performance almost as good, as shown in Tables 5 and 11. The number of false
negative continuation packets was identical to rule −369784237. The number of false
positives increased by 756, an increase of 62%.
Best performance for noise tolerance was given by rule −369784237, followed by
rule −1144617577, as shown in Table 15.
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Although rule −1023231863 produced the best results with respect to false
negative continuation packets, it also produced many times more false positives, as
shown in Tables 4 and 10.
Analysis of False Negatives
As shown by Tables 2 to 13, false negative back attack continuation packets occur
only when a back attack is present, and almost always in number slightly fewer than the
number of back attack initial packets. The program used for the experiment wrote all
false negative packets to text data files in hexadecimal form. Length, packet number, and
computed density were recorded with each packet. These were imported into Microsoft
Excel 2007 and examined manually. In every case, the packet consisted only of a string
of 0x2f, with lengths varying from 40 bytes to 1,088 bytes, with 520 bytes being the most
frequently occurring length. In almost every case, the number of false negatives is the
same as or slightly less than the number of initial back attack packets. The exceptions are
data for training week two Friday and training week three Wednesday, when some rules
found slightly more false negatives. The data show that packets significantly shorter than
the 1,460 bytes common to most back attack packets are not reliably recognized by the
cellular automaton. This could potentially be corrected in future research by including
samples of such short packets in the input to the genetic algorithm and using a ruleheterogeneous cellular automaton, as suggested in Chapter 5.
The output recorded included the packet number, making manual inspection of
the original TCPDUMP file possible. A small sample of the false negative packets was
examined in that way. In every case in the sample, the false negative packet was in the
middle of a sequence of back attack packets. That finding disproved an earlier conjecture
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that these short packets represented the last packet of a back attack. All that can be
inferred from the data are that these short packets are an artifact of the attack generation
process used when the data were prepared.
Analysis of False Positives
False negatives fell neatly into a single category: short packets containing all
0x2f. Characterizing the false positives is not as neatly done. However, the false
positives all share the characteristic of repetition. All false positives for rule −369784237
were examined. The four from training, week 7, Friday all had long sequences of 0x90,
characteristic of a buffer overflow attack. The ones from testing, week 1, Tuesday all had
long, repeating sequences of 0x21. Those from Wednesday had sequences of 0x90. The
same is true of testing, week 2, Monday, Tuesday, and Friday. Thursday of that week
had two sequences of 0x90, with the remaining 1,191 all containing long sequences of
0x84, the Unicode “control” character. Sampling the false positives from the other rules
revealed similar patterns, and on the same days. For all six rules, the largest number of
false positives was testing, week 2, Thursday. The conclusion is that the cellular
automaton correctly detects long strings of 0x2f and 0x90 found in the target packets, but
also detects certain other repeating patterns.
Summary
All six cellular automaton rules generated by the genetic algorithm detected the
two target patterns with no false negatives. False negatives for back attack continuation
packets were reported because they may give some insight into the operation of the
cellular automaton as a pattern recognizer. All false negatives are explained as shorter
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packets of 0xf2. Four of the six cellular automata were shown to be resistant to noise
injected in up to 25% of their bits.
False positives were triggered by repeating patterns in the data. At least two of
the false positives were actually other attacks, namely buffer overflow attacks against a
mail transport agent program as shown by the receiving port number in the TCPDUMP file.
Such attacks are characterized by the same sequence of 0x90 no-operation characters as
is found in the IMAP attack, a pattern specifically intended to be recognized.
The best performing rule was −369784237, which required eight cycles to reach
the accepting or rejecting state. Rule 1205312089 produced results almost as good, and
only one of the six, rule −1023231863 produced extremely large numbers of false
positives. This demonstrates that there exist multiple rule-uniform, linear cellular
automaton rules in r=2 that can detect both of the two patterns selected for study, and that
such rules can be discovered through the application of a genetic algorithm.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary
Conclusions
The research reported here has demonstrated the concept that a single cellular
automaton rule can recognize more than one target pattern, can do so in the presence of
noise, and with few cycles of the cellular automaton. Such a result is potentially
applicable to recognizing patterns in network communications, and also to searching data
repositories so large that other approaches to approximate string matching are
impractical.
The proposal for this research anticipated the need for post-screening using
another matching method to remove false positives. The value of using the cellular
automaton would have been to reduce the number of applications of the secondary
matching method to a manageable number. For the particular sample of patterns chosen,
very little post screening has been shown to be necessary for the best rules. It is
important to recognize that the cellular automaton mechanism provides only a binary,
match / no-match result; a particular record could match any pattern in the pattern set. If
a particular application makes it necessary to further distinguish data that have matched
the pattern set, post screening will be necessary in any case.
Six distinct cellular automaton rules have been shown to be capable of detecting
the initial packets of both the IMAP attack and the back attack. The rules studied do not
always identify every packet that is part of a back attack. For example, rule 1360891913
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fails to identify 1,018 back attack continuation packets in the Friday, week two training
data. This is not a fatal flaw because that rule identified every initial back attack packet,
with no false positives. In the case of detecting malicious network packets, with the
initial packet identified, the remaining packets from the same source would be discarded
without the need to examine their contents.
Because a cellular automaton can be implemented using a table look-up
(Chaudhuri et al., 1997), the rule used to drive the pattern match can be changed by
changing the contents of the table. There is no need to modify any other part of the
mechanism. Thus, a rule for a new set of patterns, or an improved rule for a particular
pattern set, can be implemented without change to the underlying mechanism.
Considerations of Timing
Cellular automata operate in constant time, as previously shown by others,
including Sommerhalder and Westrhenen (1983). Because the next state of each cell in a
cellular automaton can be determined independent of the next states of the other cells, the
number of cells in a cellular automaton, and so, the size of the pattern to be recognized,
does not influence the timing. This research has shown that, for the two patterns
examined, the number of patterns tested does not influence the time required.
However, there are two considerations that do influence the timing of the
mechanism described here. The first is the number of cycles of the cellular automaton
required to generate a recognizable result. A cellular automaton that requires fewer
cycles to reach the desired result is clearly faster (given the same implementation) as one
that requires more cycles. Because there is no general programming paradigm for
cellular automata (Crutchfield et al., 1998), cellular automata for a particular task must be
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discovered. This research used an iterative process to discover cellular automata that
would identify the patterns under study while attempting to minimize the number of
cycles required. A better approach might be to incorporate the number of cycles required
into the fitness function of the genetic algorithm as described below.
The other factor influencing timing is the need to differentiate between a final
state of the cellular automaton that indicates recognition of the pattern, an accepting state,
from states that do not, the rejecting states. For this research, the two states are
differentiated by the ones density of the cellular automaton. Unlike the operation of the
cellular automaton itself, the calculation of ones density does vary with the size of the
cellular automaton, and so with the size of the pattern to be recognized, but not with the
number of patterns to be recognized. The software used for these experiments computed
the ones density by sequentially counting the one bits. Such an approach is suitable in a
proof of concept demonstration such as this one, but is far too slow for practical
application. It requires n additions for a cellular automaton of n bits. The computation of
ones density can be parallelized if sufficient computing elements are available. Blelloch
(1993) describes the reduction operation, in which the sum of a vector of n elements can
be computed in time O(log2n) with n/2 computing elements. The reduction operation
begins by adding pairs of elements in parallel, then adding pairs of sums, and so on until
the final sum is produced. For implementation in hardware, it may be possible to
construct a combinational circuit of depth two to perform the addition (Alon & Bruck,
1994). Such a circuit would operate in constant time. It is important to note that the time
required for computation of the ones density depends only on the size of the cellular
automaton, and not on the number of patterns it recognizes.
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This research used only bit density to indicate an accepting state in the cellular
automaton. Other descriptions of the accepting state may be possible, depending upon
how the fitness function is designed. As noted above, Sarkar (2000) has pointed out that
only a single bit is necessary to indicate an accepting state, provided it is reliably on or
off. A different definition of accepting state would require a different recognition
algorithm.
Implications
The research presented has demonstrated a proof of concept that a single cellular
automaton can detect more than one pattern in data presented to it, in constant time with
respect to the number of patterns checked, and can do so in the presence of noise.
However, the sequential programming used for this proof of concept would be far too
slow for practical application. The cellular automaton approach has a speed advantage
only if its inherent parallel nature is exploited. A mechanism such as is described here
could take advantage of the parallelism of cellular automata through implementation on a
general purpose computer with parallel computing capability, or through implementation
directly in hardware.
Parallel Implementation on a General Purpose Computer
Parallel computation is readily available using off the shelf computers by taking
advantage of the processing units that exist on graphics cards. Modern graphics cards
incorporate thousands of graphics processing units and there is programming language
support for application of multiple graphics cards in a single host computer (Sanders &
Kandrot, 2011). Kauffmann (2008) has demonstrated the implementation of cellular
automata using a general purpose computer with graphics cards. If the mechanism
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described here were implemented using the parallel processing capabilities of graphics
cards, the reduction algorithm described by Blelloch (1993) could be used to compute the
ones density. Although per-processor local storage on graphics cards is limited, it is
sufficient to hold the cellular automaton rule used for determination of the next state as
well as the state bit itself (Sanders & Kandrot, 2011).
Parallel Implementation in Hardware
Each cell of a cellular automaton can be expressed as a one-bit latch (Katz, 1994).
A writable control store holding the cellular automaton rule would be required for the
table look-up function. A conceptual diagram showing computation of the next state of a
cell using table look-up from a control store is presented in Figure 4. The reduction
method described by Blelloch (1993) is amenable to implementation as a cascade of full
adders, and would still operate in O(log2n) time where n is the size of the cellular
automaton. Such a circuit could potentially be implemented directly on a network
interface card. A conceptual diagram of a cellular automaton pattern recognizer
implemented in hardware is given in Figure 5.
Recommendations
The research presented here has confirmed the hypothesis that there exist cellular
automaton rules that can recognize more than one pattern in constant time with respect to
the number of patterns, and in the presence of noise or perturbation. It remains to be
shown whether other patterns than those chosen, or more than two patterns can be
matched. There may exist better fitness functions than the one presented here, or more
effective arrangements of the cellular automaton. Evaluation of the cellular automaton’s
final state for accepting or rejecting a pattern based on ones density takes O(log2n) time if
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implemented in parallel using multiple processing units, where n is the number of cells in
the cellular automaton (Blelloch, 1993). While the time to evaluate the final state is
constant with respect to the number of patterns, it may be possible to improve upon it.
Only two patterns were tested in the experiments reported here. Empirical testing
might establish an upper limit on the number of patterns that can be recognized by the
cellular automaton described here, or by other types of cellular automata.
Regardless of the improvements that may be possible, if best evaluation speed is
to be achieved, it is clear that most of the work must be in the genetic algorithm and not
in the cellular automaton. This may mean a greater focus on the fitness function than on
the cellular automaton itself. In any case, changes in the structure of the cellular
automaton must be reflected in the fitness function.
Modification to the Cellular Automaton
The research presented here started with the simplest possible cellular automaton,
a binary, rule-uniform, linear cellular automaton. Because preliminary research had
shown that a radius of one was unlikely to be effective at matching more than one
pattern, experiments began with cellular automata of r = 2. Radii larger than two
increase the number of bits of the pattern that participate in the computation of the next
state of the cellular automaton, which may offer an opportunity for improvement.
Increased radii also increase the number of potential rules exponentially. A radius of
three examines seven bits of the pattern when computing the next state of each cell and
uses 128-bit rules, of which there are 2128. An increase to a radius of four would mean a
rule space of 2512. It is unknown whether increasing the radius would improve the pattern
recognition ability of the cellular automaton, nor whether such large rule spaces can be

62
searched effectively using genetic algorithms. The fact that there exist several rules for
cellular automata of r = 2 that recognize the patterns studied suggests that the same
condition may hold true for cellular automata of larger radius. If that is the case,
searching by genetic algorithm may be practical even in the face of very large rule
spaces.
The cellular automata presented here are rule-uniform; the same rule is used to
evaluate the next state of every cell. Although the rules studied produced very high
sensitivity, there were false negative results for some back attack continuation packets.
That is expected because back attack continuation packets were not a part of the pattern
set being tested. Packets that produced false negatives for continuation packets were
written to a file and examined individually. In every case, they were shorter than the
packets that were detected correctly. This research was based on a cellular automaton of
fixed length. The shorter packets were padded on the right with zeros to make all packets
the same length. A rule-heterogeneous cellular automaton might perform better by
allowing those rightmost bits to be evaluated by a different rule than the leftmost bits.
Each rule would be represented by a gene in the chromosome evaluated by the genetic
algorithm. Alternatively, the length of the cellular automaton itself might be varied
depending upon the size of the patterns in the set of target patterns. If all states are
evaluated in parallel, there is no time penalty for doing so.
Improvements in the Fitness Function
The experiments reported here identified several rules that would recognize the
patterns under study. Even rules with fitness > 0.75 varied in sensitivity and specificity,
suggesting that improvements are possible in the fitness function. One such
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improvement might be the inclusion of more samples of the pattern to be detected in the
evaluation by the fitness function. An entirely different approach to the fitness function
might also produce better results.
The number of cycles required for a cellular automaton to reach an accepting or
rejecting state is an important parameter with respect to performance. The cycle count
was determined iteratively by experiment for the results reported here. Incorporating the
cycle count as a gene in the chromosome evaluated by the genetic algorithm could
potentially identify cellular automata that require fewer cycles and still exhibit equivalent
performance.
More Effective Accepting State Conditions
The accepting and rejecting states for the cellular automata studied here are
derived from the ones density of the cellular automaton after a specified number of
cycles. The fastest programmatic computation of ones density is the reduction operation
described by Blelloch (1993), which requires O(log2n) operations. The two-level digital
logic construction described by Alon and Bruck (1994) could potentially compute the
ones density in constant time, but requires direct implementation in digital logic. Speed
improvements might also be possible by defining the accepting state in terms other than
ones density. A single bit is enough to define an accepting state if it reliably reflects the
accepting or rejecting state (Sarkar, 2000). A simpler accepting state consisting of a
pattern of bits might thus be recognizable in less time than that required for computation
of the ones density.
Another alternative is an accepting state that generates a repeating value in the
cellular automaton itself. Such a condition can be recognized by a bitwise comparison of
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current cell values of the cellular automaton with previous cell values. If the
implementation includes one processor per cell, the comparisons can be made in parallel.
The amount of storage for previous states depends upon the period of repetition of the
pattern.
Summary
This research has produced a prototype that demonstrates the hypothesis that a
cellular automaton can recognize more than one pattern using a single rule. Sensitivity
was greater than 0.97 for all six of the rules tested and specificity was 1.0 for four of the
rules tested. For the patterns selected for testing, very little post screening would have
been necessary.
Discovery of rules suitable for pattern recognition through the application of
genetic algorithms has been shown to be possible. The genetic algorithm was able to
identify multiple rules that can detect the patterns chosen for these experiments.
Pattern recognition has been shown to be possible even in the presence of noise.
When the density tolerance was widened to include 25% of the distance between the
target density and the non-target density, four of the rules recognized the two patterns
tested even when up to 25% of the bits in the packet were modified. Testing patterns for
recognition using the relaxed density band produced results nearly identical to the
original tests.
Experimentation was done entirely using sequential programming on a von
Neumann architecture computer. Parallel implementation would be necessary to achieve
processing times competitive with other approximate string matching algorithms.
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Appendix A

Tables
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Table 1. True incidence of target packets as determined by hand-crafted string
comparison rules. For the training data sets, only those marked as having attack packets
of the types under study were tested. All “testing” data sets were tested. “Total Packets”
is the number of TCP packets subjected to testing. The total number of packets in each
data set is larger because there are packets from protocols other than TCP. Those were
not tested.
IMAP

Data Set
Attack
Training , Week 2, Fri
1
Training , Week 3, Wed
0
Training , Week 6, Wed
0
Training , Week 7, Fri
0
Testing, Week 1, Mon
0
Testing, Week 1, Tue
0
Testing, Week 1, Wed
0
Testing, Week 1, Thu
0
Testing, Week 1, Fri
0
Testing, Week 2, Mon
0
Testing, Week 2, Tue
0
Testing, Week 2, Wed
1
Testing, Week 2, Thu
0
Testing, Week 2, Fri
0
Totals
2

Back Attack Back Attack
Total
Total
Initial
Continuation Attacks
Packets
1,000
36,711
37,712 215,666
1,000
36,729
37,729 264,776
100
3,694
3,794 475,551
108
3,507
3,615 636,290
0
0
0 712,669
0
0
0 719,181
0
0
0 416,752
0
0
0 520,950
1,013
36,438
37,451 637,774
0
0
0 520,025
0
0
0 559,699
3,666
3,767
40,026
100
0
0
0 898,028
0
0
0 625,445
3,321
120,745 124,068 7,242,832
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Table 2. Performance of rule −369784237 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.22758333 after eight cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule −369784237 had a
fitness of 0.8530 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
1,193
0
1
0
1,215
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
963 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.973
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 3. Performance of rule −1144617577 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.34941667 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule −1144617577 had
a fitness of 0.7659 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
11
0
0
0
1,341
0
30
0
1,399
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
963 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.973
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 4. Performance of rule −1023231863 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.51041670 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule −1023231863 had
a fitness of 0.8730 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
False
Attack False Neg
Pos Initial
Cont
35,745
214
0
35,759
264
0
3,594
477
0
3,415
799
0
0
684
0
0 9,663
0
0
715
0
0 1,192
0
35,486
693
0
0 9,296
0
0
960
0
3,566 16,287
0
0 8,478
0
0 7,879
0
117,565 57,601
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
966 177,954
970 227,047
100 471,757
92 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
952 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,180 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.975
0.974
0.977
0.979

Specificity
0.999
0.999
0.999
0.999

0.975 0.999

0.995

0.69

0.974 0.992
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Table 5. Performance of rule 1205312089 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.22483334 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule 1205312089 had a
fitness of 0.8622 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
6
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
0
0
1,196
0
1
0
1,216
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
963 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.973
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 6. Performance of rule 1360891913 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.25925000 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule 1360891913 had a
fitness of 0.8126 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
192
0
120
0
42
0
304
0
209
0
143
0
28
0
246
0
137
0
156
0
238
0
171
0
1,490
0
101
0
3,577
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
963 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.976

Specificity
0.999
0.999
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.975 0.995

0.974 0.999
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Table 7. Performance of rule 1386779481 with strict density evaluation on back attack
packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less than or
equal to 0.25208333 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule 1386779481 had a
fitness of 0.8745 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
7
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
2
0
0
0
1,391
0
1
0
1,408
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
963 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.973
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 8. Performance of rule −369784237 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.28314583 after eight cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
−369784237 had a fitness of 0.8530 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,701
35,734
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,476
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,484

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
12
0
1
0
3
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
2
0
1,279
0
1
0
1,310
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,010 177,954
995 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
962 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,261 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 9. Performance of rule −1144617577 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.421625003 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
−1144617577 had a fitness of 0.7659 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,702
35,735
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,476
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,486

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
2
0
0
0
6
0
2
0
32
0
2
0
3
0
1
0
5
0
12
0
47
0
1,450
0
31
0
1,593
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,009 177,954
994 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
962 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,259 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.974 0.999

0.974 1.000
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Table 10. Performance of rule −1023231863 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.5233542 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
−1023231863 had a fitness of 0.8730 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
3
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,324

Back
Attack
Cont
35,746
35,759
3,594
3,415
0
0
2
0
35,488
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,570

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
469
0
559
0
1,204
0
2,037
0
1,739
0
11,530
0
1,716
0
2,385
0
1,739
0
11,020
0
2,061
0
20,474
0
16,359
0
8,963
0
82,255
0

False
Neg
True
Cont Negative
965 177,954
970 227,047
100 471,757
92 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
950 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,177 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.975
0.975
0.980
0.984

Specificity
0.997
0.998
0.997
0.997

0.976 0.997

0.996 0.639

0.974 0.989
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Table 11. Performance of rule 1205312089 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.290145838 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
1205312089 had a fitness of 0.8622 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,701
35,734
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,476
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,484

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
0
0
4
0
0
0
15
0
1
0
2
0
0
0
4
0
4
0
2
0
1,938
0
1
0
1,971
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,010 177,954
995 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
962 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,261 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.973 1.000

0.974 1.000
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Table 12. Performance of rule 1360891913 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.27354167 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
1360891913 had a fitness of 0.8126 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,693
35,728
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,475
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,469

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
297
0
199
0
94
0
441
0
331
0
238
0
79
0
385
0
237
0
325
0
415
0
297
0
1,656
0
254
0
5,248
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,018 177,954
1,001 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
963 520,950
0 600,323
0 520,025
100 559,699
0
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,276 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.977

Specificity
0.998
0.999
1.000
0.999

1.000 1.000

1.000 0.992

0.974 0.999
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Table 13. Performance of rule 1386779481 with relaxed density evaluation on back
attack packets. A packet was selected as an attack packet if it had a ones density less
than or equal to 0.333624998 after four cycles of the cellular automaton. Rule
1386779481 had a fitness of 0.8745 by the fitness function used for this report.

Data Set
Train Wk 2 Fri
Train Wk 3 Wed
Train Wk 6 Wed
Train Wk 7 Fri
Test Wk 1 Mon
Test Wk 1 Tue
Test Wk 1 Wed
Test Wk 1 Thu
Test Wk 1 Fri
Test Wk 2 Mon
Test Wk 2 Tue
Test Wk 2 Wed
Test Wk 2 Thu
Test Wk 2 Fri
Totals

Back
Attack
Initial
1,000
1,000
100
108
0
0
0
0
1,013
0
0
100
0
0
3,321

Back
Attack
Cont
35,702
35,735
3,594
3,413
0
0
0
0
35,476
0
0
3,566
0
0
117,486

False
False Neg
Pos Initial
0
0
0
0
30
0
20
0
9
0
30
0
73
0
3
0
0
0
9
0
24
0
40
0
1,556
0
5
0
1,799
0

False
True
Neg
Cont Negative
1,009 177,954
994 227,047
100 471,757
94 632,675
0 712,669
0 719,181
0 416,752
0 520,950
962 600,323
0 520,025
0 559,699
100
36,259
0 898,028
0 625,445
3,259 7,118,764

Sensitivity
0.973
0.974
0.974
0.974

Specificity
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000

0.974 1.000

0.974 0.999

0.974 1.000
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Table 14. Comparison of strict and relaxed rules. For each rule tested, the table shows
the difference in false positive results and false negative results for the strict and relaxed
density rules. False negatives are for back attack continuation packets only; there are no
false negatives for initial packets for any rule.
Rule
-369784237
-1144617577
-1023231863
1205312089
1360891913
1386779481

–––– False Positives ––––– – False Negative Continuation –
Strict Relaxed
Diff
Strict
Relaxed
Diff
1,215
1,310
95
3,276
3,261
-15
1,399
1,593
194
3,276
3,259
-17
57,601 82,255 24,654
3,180
3,177
-3
1,216
1,971
755
3,276
3,261
-15
3,577
5,248
1,671
3,276
3,276
0
1,408
1,799
391
3,276
3,259
-17

Table 15. Sensitivity to perturbation. Bits in two test packets were complemented
randomly with replacement. The table shows the percentage of bits that could be
modified before the density of the cellular automaton exceeded the upper density bound.
Testing was with the relaxed density rule. Testing stopped at 0.25 (25%) of bits
modified.
Perturbation
Tolerated
-369784237
0.25
-1144617577
0.25
-1023231863
0.04
1205312089
0.25
1360891913
0.04
1386779481
0.25
Rule

Table 16. Rules tested with their density and fitness values. “Cycles” is the number of
cellular automaton cycles used in the tests. Packets were considered attack packets if
their ones densities were less than or equal to the values given.

Rule
Cycles Fitness
-369784237
8
0.8530
-1144617577
4
0.7659
-1023231863
4
0.8731
1205312089
4
0.8622
1360891913
4
0.8127
1386779481
4
0.8746

Strict
Density
0.2275833
0.3494167
0.5104167
0.2248333
0.25925
0.2520833

Relaxed
Density
0.28315
0.42163
0.52335
0.29015
0.27354
0.33362
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Table 17. Experimental data collected.
Actual IMAP attack packets (detected by string comparison)
Actual back attack initial packets (detected by string comparison)
Actual back attack continuation packets (detected by string comparison)
IMAP attack packets detected by cellular automaton
Back attack initial packets detected by cellular automaton
Back attack continuation packets detected by cellular automaton
False positive packets
False negative IMAP attack packets
False negatice back attack initial packets
False negative back attack contiuation packets
Total packets read
IP packets read
TCP packets read and processed by cellular automaton
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Appendix B

Figures
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Figure 1. Operation of cellular automaton rule 1205312089 with the first 96 bits of data
from packet 1,819 of the Friday week two training data. The initial data and four cycles
of the cellular automaton cell values are shown as five rows in the figure. The ones
density does not decrease below the density threshold for this rule. This packet would
not be selected as a match.

Figure 2. Operation of cellular automaton rule 1205312089 with 96 bits 0x2f characters,
representing a back attack packet. The initial data and four cycles of the cellular
automaton cell values are shown as five rows in the figure. A pattern of four zero bits
and four one bits emerges in cycle two. In cycle three, the bits alternate between zero
and one except near the boundaries. In cycle four, nearly all bits are zero. The ones
density is 0.073, indicating that this packet matches a pattern in the set.

Figure 3. Operation of cellular automaton rule 1205312089 with 96 bits 0x90 characters,
representing an IMAP attack packet. The initial data and four cycles of the cellular
automaton cell values are shown as five rows in the figure. Cycles two, three, and four
exhibit the same patterns seen in Figure 2. At the end of cycle four, the ones density is
0.042, indicating that this packet matches a pattern in the set.
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Figure 4. A conceptual diagram showing how the next state of a cellular automaton can
be computed using the table look-up mechanism with a control store.
The next state of cell i is to be computed. The computation relies on the current states of
cells i–2, i–1, i, i+1, and i+2. The contents of those five cells form a five bit address into
the control store.
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Figure 5. A conceptual diagram showing the implementation in hardware of a pattern
recognizer based on the use of cellular automata, with accepting state defined by bit
density bands.
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